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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
CHARLES E. STINNETT,
PetitionerAppellant,
v.

Case No.
10762

JOHN W. TURNER,
Warden, Utah State Prison,
Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The appellant, Charles E. Stinnett appeals from
the denial of his petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The appellant filed his petition for a writ of
Habeas Corpus in the District Court of the Third
Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake County. A pretrial hearing was held on October 7th, 1966, before

2

the Honorable A.H. Ellett, judge presiding. The trial
court denied appellant's petition for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent submits the decision of the trial
should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On September 10, 1955, appellant entered a
plea of guilty to a charge of robbery, and was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for the term provided
by law. It is appellant's claim in his petition for a writ
of Habeas Corpus that certain constitutional rights
were denied him prior to his entry of a plea o f •
guilty. Appellant's petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus was filed on the 19th day of September, 1966.
(R. 19). Gerald G. Gundry of the Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association was appointed to represent the
appellant at the pretrial hearing. The matter came on
for hearing on the 7th of October, 1966, the court received testimony from Aldon J. Anderson on October 24, 1966 (R. 25, 29). An order denying the petition
for a writ of Habeas Corpus was entered on October 28, 1966. Other pertinent facts will be mentioned on the argument portion of this brief.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE RECORD AT THE PRETRIAL HEARING DISCLOSES NO EVIDENCE THAT THE COURT WAS
PREJUDICED AGAINST THE APPELLANT.
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Appellant in his brief apparently argues that
certain of the statements between the court and respondent counsel were prejudicial to him. On a
careful reading and subsequent re-reading of the
transcribed testimony respondent finds no evidence
of a bias or prejudice toward appellant by the court.
To support his argument of prejudice, appellant
cites the following language:
"THE COURT: All right then I will deny his writ
if Anderson files an affidavit denying that any such
deals were made. If he admits it, the boy ought to be
freed and remanded to the custody of the sheriff,
and the district attorney can proceed to try him."
(R. 27).

Appellant cites in his brief only the first sentence in
the above quoted statement. The statement itself is
the summary as to what respective counsel had
agreed with respect to corroborating an allegation
made in appellant's petition. It was the opinion of
the court and counsel on both sides at the pre-tria.l
hearing that the only claim with even a trace
of merit was that appellant had involuntarily entered his plea of guilty. (R. 25). It is clear that if the
district attorney had promised appellant that he
would be granted probation in exchange for a plea
of guilty then the writ should have issued. On
the date on which appellant entered his plea of
guilty the district attorney was the Honorable Aldon
J. Anderson, now judge of the Third Judicial District
of the State of Utah. In order to corroborate appellant's claim, it was agreed that an affidavit from
Judge Anderson would be sufficient.
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In substance, all that was discussed at the pretrial hearing was the manner in which the only witness named in the petition would have his testimony made a matter of the record. Throughout the
transcript of that hearing there is no evidence that
the court was biased or prejudiced against appellant. On the contrary, the court was entirely fair
and even vigorously attempted to secure testimony
b support appellant's claim.
"THE COURT: and if Aldon Anderson told him
that [appellant would receive probation if he entered
a plea of guilty] and persuaded him to enter a plea
of guilty something should be done ... " (R. 26)

Thus, it is clear the court fairly and without
prejudice entertained appellant's contentions.
POINT II
COURT APPOINTED COUNSEL AT THE PRETRIAL HEARING ADEQUATELY AND ETHICALLY
REPRESENTED APPELLANT.

From a careful reading of appellant's brief it
appears that he complains about the following:
(a) that counsel failed to research and subpoena witnesses; (b) that counsel failed to call appellant to
testify in his own behalf; (c) that counsel failed to
inquire into the loss of an important exhibit. All
these points appellant urges as evidence of counsel's "negligence and incompetence." In the light
of the record herein, such an allegation is unwarranted, unsupported, irresponsible, and is a wholly
unjustifiable attack on a competent and respected
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member of the Utah State Bar. The answers to the
points raised in appellant's second argument are
very simple: first, counsel did not fail to research
and subpoena witnesses because there were no
witnesses other than Judge Anderson mentioned in
appellant's petition. Counsel is not charged with
knowledge of witnesses not mentioned in the petition. Harding v. Logan, 251 F. Supp. 710 (D. N.C.
1966). Judge Anderson did, in fact, testify and his
testimony was in direct conflict to appellant's claim
(r. 29-30); secondly, no purpose would be served by
hci.ving appellant testify in his own behalf since his
sworn petition is accorded every bit as much weight
as would be given his direct testimony. Long v.
Hudspeth, 164 Kan. 720, 192 P.2d 169 (1948); thirdly,
a transcript of the original proceedings was not
necessary to his defense since taking all of the allegations in the petition as true, the only one that
would support the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus was the allegation that the district attorney
had wrongly induced a plea of guilty. That allegation was conclusively refuted by Judge Anderson's
testimony. There is in the record no evidence that
appellant's counsel was negligent or incompete:r..t
in any way.
POINT III
THE COURT DID NOT FAIL TO CONSIDER EACH
AND EVERY ALLEGATION IN APPELLANT'S PETITION.

Throughout his petition appellant repeatedly
makes vague claims of a denial of his constitutionai
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rights. It must be assumed that the trial court gave
careful consideration and read appellant's petition
in its entirety. Aside from his claim that his guiltv
plea was involuntary, if we assume, as obviously
the trial court in this case must have done, that
everything in said petition was true, appellant has
still presented no grounds for issuance of the writ
of Habeas Corpus. Ramseur v. Blackwell, 361 F.2d
123 (5th Cir. 1966); Smoake v. Willingham, 359 F.2d
386 (10th Cir. 1966). Appellant apparently is arguing
that the recent case of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966), should apply to him. However, that Miranda does not have retroactive scope has been clearly
stated in Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (196e).
"In this case we are called upon to determine whether Escobedo v. Illinois and Miranda v. Arizona should
be applied retroactively. We hold that Escobedo affects only those cases in which the trial began after
June 22, 1964, the date of that decision. We hold
further that Mirada applies only to cases in which
the trial began after the date of our decision one
week ago. The convictions assailed here were obtained
at trials completed long before Escobedo and Miranda
were rendered, and the ruling in those cases are therefore in applicable to the present proceeding."

Thus, it is clear that the only meritorious argument presented in appellant's petition for writ of
habeas corpus is that concerning the voluntariness
of his plea as that issue is discussed in Point IV of
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this brief. Therefore, the denial of appellant's petition is conclusive evidence that the court construed
each possible argument in a manner most favorable
to appellant and decided as a matter of law that none
were sufficient to justify the issuance of the writ.
POINT IV
APPELLANT'S PLEA OF GUILTY WAS ENTERED FREELY AND VOLUNTARILY SINCE HE WAS
ADVISED BY COMPETENT COUNSEL AT THE TIME
OF ENTERING HIS PLEA; AND FURTHER, PETITIONER'S UNSUPPORTED AND UNCORROBORATED ALLEGATIONS OF COERCION WILL NOT SUPPORT THE
ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.

Although appellant makes many claims that he
was deprived of certain constitutional rights in the
original proceedings, in light of the record here
presented, respondent submits that all of said
claims are wholly without basis. Appellant was provided with court appointed counsel in the original
prosecution for robbery, and in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it must be assumed that he
was represented adequately. (R. 17). His counsel at
the time was and is a highly respected member of
the Utah State Bar. Consequently it must be assumed that appellant was fully aware of his rights
at the time of entering his plea. Burge v. State,
90 Idaho 473, 413 P.2d 451 (1966).
It is evident from the discussion in the trial court
that all parties were agreed that had the district attorney made promises to the defendant to the effect
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that there would be probation if he would plead
guilty, then this would surely require a Habeas
Corpus hearing. With this premise, the respondent
is in agreement. Williams v. Swope. 186 F.2d 897
(9th Cir. 1951). However, where the record refutes
the claim that a guilty plea was not freely and knowingly entered, the court is correct in denying a hearing. Webb v. Crouse. 359 F.2d 394 (10th Cir. 1966):
Hicks v. Hand. 189 Kan. 415, 369 P.2d 250 (1962). It
is not denied that were his allegations with respect
to the statements made to him by the district attorney true, he would have to be remanded for a nevr
trial. Milewski v. Ashe. 362 Pa. 48, 66 A.2d 281 (1949).
However, a trial court is not required to believe unsupported testimony of a habeas corpus petitioner
even though the respondent might not offer any
evidence in contradiction. Ex Parte Farrell. 189 F.2d
540 Ost Cir. 1951), Cert.Den., Farrell v. O'Brien. 342
U.S. 839 (1951 ). In the case now before this court the
trial court did not have only the petitioner's own
statements, the court was afforded the opportunity
to have the person who allegedly had made the
promise to the petitioner testify to the matter. As a
result, the claim of petitioner is clearly and emphatically contradicted. Absent some evidence to support
this claim, a writ will not issue. Jackson v. Sanford. 79 F. Supp. 74 (D. Ga. 1947), Ex Parte Matthews,
85 Okla. Cr. 173, 186 P.2d 840 (1947); Blevins v. Hudspeth. 166 Kan. 117, 199 P.2d 171 (1948).
CONCLUSION
It is submitted that all of the arguments in both
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appellant's brief and petition for the writ of Habeas
Corpus are without merit. They constitute a scurrilous and unfounded attack on the legal profession
and its members. A careful reading of the entire
record in this case merely convinces the respondent
of the adequacy of the original proceedings and
also those of the pretrial hearing on the petition. The
appellant has been given every benefit; every concession has been made for him; there is absolutely
no evidence that he has been denied any rights
protected by the constitution; no evidence that all
efforts have not been made to guarantee appellant
fair treatment. This appeal is without merit and the
denial of the writ of Habeas Corpus should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General

J. FRANKLIN ALLRED
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

